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Is Informal Sector Work an Alternative to Workfare Benefits? 
The Case of Pre-Program Expansion and Economic Crisis
* 
 
Limited availability of workfare programs and unemployment insurance and a large informal 
sector are features of the Argentine labor market at the outset of the 2001 economic crisis. 
This paper tests the hypothesis whether informal work is an alternative to workfare 
participation before a large-scale program expansion took place. Results from the propensity 
score matching indicate that observable characteristics of informal low-income workers and 
current workfare participants are significantly different. However, within these groups, it is 
possible to identify subgroups that exhibit similar observable characteristics. This indicates 
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Salvador for the provision of the eligibility criteria information for Plan Trabajar. All errors are my own. "In a society in which there is no regular system of unemployment benefit, and in which 
poor relief is either non-existent or "less eligible" than almost any alternative short of 
suicide, a man who is thrown out of work must scratch up a living somehow or other by 
means of his own efforts. And under any system in which complete idleness is not a 
statutory condition for drawing the dole
1, a man who cannot find a regular job will 
naturally employ his time as usefully as he may." 
Joan Robinson. 1937. Essays in the theory of employment. London: Macmillan, pp.83-84. 
 
1. Introduction 
As highlighted by Joan Robinson (1937), in the absence of a regular system of 
unemployment benefit or support casual and informal work seems the only alternative for 
survival of the unemployed. 
This paper tests the hypothesis that informal waged workers and self-employed with low-
incomes are in the informal sector as an alternative to limited available workfare benefits 
in an economic crisis.
2
Informal waged workers and the self-employed outside social protection, social insurance 
and social assistance, and their comparability to workfare participants have not been 
explored in the empirical literature on program evaluation. Still, this link is quite 
apparent: Workfare and conditional cash transfer programs are some of the non-
contributory safety net programs that can reach the informal sector workers, which do not 
have access to the formal unemployment insurance system (Vodopivec 2004). For 
instance, in the case of Argentina in 1991 a system of unemployment benefits was 
introduced, but it had very little general coverage (Marshall 2004). In Table 1 this point is 
illustrated with a sample of the unemployed in the October 2001 and 2002 Argentine 
household survey rounds. Only 2.92 percent and 2.77 percent of the unemployed in 2001 
and 2002 respectively received income from unemployment insurance. 
                                                 
1The "dole" is here used to mean any kind of relief payments. 
2Informal waged workers are dependent employees that do not have access or rights to a pension. The self-
employed are independent workers and microentrepreneurs, who are bosses of firms with 1-5 employees. 




  2Alongside the unemployment insurance system, various workfare programs for the 
unemployed coexist and provide assistance and protection for a large share of the labor 
force in Argentina (Bertranou and Bonari 2005). With increasing unemployment in the 
economy, the government introduced these workfare programs from 1993 onwards. 
Participation in the workfare programs continued to grow after 1998 and peaked after the 
Argentine economic crisis in 2001/02. The economic situation during that time period is 
documented with the GDP and GDP growth numbers in Figure 1. From 1998 onwards 
the Argentine economy was in recession and ultimately experienced a large scale 
economic crisis, with a sharp drop in GDP growth in 2002 with the devaluation of the 
Argentine Peso. However, the economic crisis already started the last quarter of 2001 
with political, financial and economic turmoil of large-scale proportions. This is also 
reflected in large increases in poverty and indigence rates and labor market impacts 
(Khamis 2008).  
Informality in the labor market was also another feature of the Argentine labor market 
during the crisis and beforehand. Over the 1990s also informalisation in the labor market 
rose and increased substantially after the crisis (Gaspirini 2002; World Bank 2006). A 
larger segment of informal waged workers, self-employed and workfare participants 
coexist alongside formal waged workers and the unemployed. 
Participation in workfare programs usually is subject to work requirements, which serve 
to provide incentives in terms of self-targeting and poverty-reducing investments (Besley 
and Coate 1992). In the presence of low enforcement of some of the workfare programs' 
eligibility criteria, most noticeably the criteria that participants cannot even hold an 
informal job before entry into the program or the effort and completion of the work 
requirement, might be very difficult to monitor in a developing country labor market.
3 
Due to these difficulties, workfare participants might pursue jobs as informal waged 
workers and self-employed.
4 Informal waged and self-employed work and workfare 
program participation could be substitutes or even complements for other household 
                                                 
3Also the need to monitor the continued eligibility for unemployment insurance and the informal labor 
market options is raised as an issue by Vodopivec (2004). 
4Participation in a workfare program might distort incentives to remain or become beneficiaries. It might 
lead to changed labor market arrangements within the household (Mkandawire 2006). In the case of 
Argentina this is documented in the re-formation of households, multiple household heads in one family 
and family splitting (Jalan and Ravallion 1999, 2003). 
  3members and their income. 
This paper investigates the hypothesis that in the labor market for low-income individuals 
the informal sector, more specifically informal waged workers and the self-employed, has 
a potential substitute role for limited access to workfare programs.
5
This hypothesis is tested in an environment with limited workfare coverage and general 
economic recession at the onset of the Argentine economic crisis in 2001, just before the 
introduction of a near universal workfare program. This analysis provides an insight 
whether workers from the low-wage informal sector could form a potential entrant group 
to a more extended workfare program. Using observable characteristics the two groups, 
the current workfare participants and the control group from the low-wage informal 
sector are compared with propensity score matching.
6 Being able to use propensity score 
matching according to observable characteristics, including the specific eligibility criteria 
and program participation related characteristics, would provide empirical evidence for 
the hypothesis that these two groups constitute potential substitutes in the labor market 
for low-income individuals. Empirical evidence on this is limited as of yet. This paper 
contributes with a simple test using recent econometric techniques of the program 
evaluation literature. 
In the next section background on workfare programs in Argentina, in particular the 
eligibility criteria for program participation necessary for the later estimation strategy, is 
presented. Also the most relevant literature on Argentine workfare programs is discussed 
in relation to the research presented in this paper. A discussion of the chosen empirical 
methodology and data follows. Propensity score matching with different comparison 
groups and the treatment group, workfare participants, is employed in this context.  
The main finding of this paper is that observable characteristics of informal low-income 
workers and current workfare participants are significantly different. However, within 
these groups, it is possible to identify subgroups that exhibit similar observable 
characteristics. This indicates that only a subset of the individuals sees workfare and 
                                                 
5It is harder to check whether workfare participants work parallel to their workfare program work as the 
workfare participants are coded in differential ways in their work status in the Argentine household survey. 
Sometimes, in the supplementary survey of Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogares (the main workfare program after 
the Argentine economic crisis 2001/02), they are coded as part of salaried employees or unemployed or 
inactive. This depends on the status and level of their work requirement and the receipt of the work benefit. 
6 This analysis does account for observable characteristics but not unobservables.  
  4informal sector work as substitutable alternatives. In addition to that I find that only 10 
percent of the minimum wage, around 20 Argentine Peso, can be accounted to the 
workfare program as impact when using the informal sector as comparison group.  
In the latter sections of this paper these results and its implications for policy are 
discussed in detail.  
 
2. Workfare programs: Eligibility Criteria and Informality 
2.1 History and Eligibility criteria 
Since the early 1990s several workfare programs, which all were targeted at the least-
skilled unemployed workers, with a small monthly benefit and work or training 
requirement in return were implemented by the Argentine government.  The main 
intended objectives were to provide a short-term safety net during times of economic 
recession and to increase the employability of the unemployed. 
These programs were available on the national and provincial level in Argentina. 
Programa Intensivo de Trabajo, Plan Trabajar I, II, III and Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
were the major national employment programs implemented successively throughout the 
1990s to 2005.
7
In 1993 Programa Intensive de Trabajo (PIT) was introduced and targeted at the long-
term unemployed household heads. Beneficiaries were required to work on basic 
infrastructure projects and were able to claim this benefit for six month with an extension 
possibility for another six months (Bertranou and Bonari 2005). 
Following PIT and after the 1995-96 recession, which led to substantial increases in 
unemployment among the poor and non-poor, Plan Trabajar I was implemented in March 
1996. It was subsequently extended until 2002 (Plan Trabajar I to Plan Trabajar III). 
From Plan Trabajar I onwards the eligibility criteria were amended in order to insure 
closer targeting of poorer households more closely. The requirement `to be a household 
head or to have young dependents' was dropped to allow more general access for the 
unemployed poor and vulnerable (Eisenstedt 1998). 
In general persons older than 16 years of age who were unemployed and poor were able 
to benefit and receive about or below ARG$ 200 Peso (Ronconi 2002; Jalan and 
                                                 
7Other smaller programs are described in Bertranou and Bonari (2005) and Ministerio de Economia (2006). 
  5Ravallion 1999). Thus, the benefit of Plan Trabajar was set at or below the prevailing 
minimum wage and therefore ensured self-targeting of beneficiaries (Jalan and Ravallion 
1999).
8 In return the participants were required to work in community projects relating to 
basic infrastructure and community services. Eligible participants were able to receive the 
benefit for six months (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social 1998). 
After the economics crisis, in April 2002, Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar was put in place to 
assist Argentines, who experienced a rise in individual poverty rates from 35.9 percent in 
May 2001 to 53 percent in May 2002 (Khamis 2008). This program continued until the 
end of 2005, when a transition and reassignment of Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogares 
beneficiaries to Familias, a conditional cash transfer program, started and continued in 
2006 (World Bank 2006). To be eligible for the receipt of Plan Jefes one needed to be an 
unemployed head of household with children under 18 years or disabled children in the 
household.
9
The work requirement for participants was set at a minimum of four hours per day and 
maximum of six hours per day. The activity could be working on community projects or 
basic community work. Also training or finalization of formal education in the form of 
school attendance was counted towards this requirement. Also participants, that found 
work in private companies, were entitled to receive the benefit in the form of a wage 
subsidy for six months. Participants received ARG$ 150 Peso monthly.
10
Registration to the program was cross-checked with administrative records on social 
security contributions to see whether workfare applicants were working in the formal 
sector (Galasso and Ravallion 2003; Giovagnoli 2005; Gasparini, Haimovich and Oliveri 
2006). Contrary to this, it was much harder to check whether an applicant was working in 
the informal sector, as an informal waged worker or self-employed, beforehand or even 
                                                 
8 Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2004) discuss issues of Argentina’s Plan Trabajar targeting and find that it 
was able to transfer 80 percent of program benefits to the poorest quintile. The maximum wages paid was 
set at the minimum wage initially but was adjusted to a lower level at a later stage, which ensured the 
targeting towards the poorest in the population.  
9The precise eligible criteria were available on the Argentine Ministry of Labor website on the beneficiaries 
of Plan Jefes de Hogar: http://www.trabajo. 
gov.ar/jefes/beneficiarios/index.asp, (accessed 8th March, 2007) and MTSS (2004). 
10Modolo (2004) describes in detail institutional, political and social dimensions of the workfare program, 
which are not discussed here. 
 
 
  6parallel to workfare benefit receipt. 
Plan Jefes program was almost universal by October 2002, which meant that most people 
self-selected into the program as participant or applicant, but not everyone was formally 
employed and then unemployed who received the benefit. Some leakages of the benefit to 
previously inactive and informal workers were recorded (Galasso and Ravallion 2003, 
2004).  
Overall, the different workfare programs, Plan Trabajar I to III and Plan Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar, described in this section were the largest national programs at the time and share 
similar general eligibility criteria: 
 
Self-targeting at a low benefit, below minimum wage levels, and a work requirement in 
some form or another. The beneficiary’s previous labor market status was supposed to be 
unemployed and not in formal work at the time of the workfare benefit application. 
 
Still, this left some potential for targeting inefficiencies: applicants and participants with 
informal waged work or in self-employment could apply or participate in the workfare 
program. 
2.2 Workfare programs and Informality 
The vast literature on Argentine workfare programs has centered on several elements: 
program impact evaluation and program incentives relating to political economy and 
program inefficiencies.
11 This section describes a more narrow literature on workfare 
programs and informality in Argentina and highlights the existing gaps in the literature 
with respect to the empirical analysis of the low-waged informal and self-employed labor 
                                                 
11For evaluations of the various workfare programs and their dimensions on employment and poverty: 
(Galasso and Ravallion 2003, 2004; Galasso, Ravallion and Salvia 2001; Jalan and Ravallion 1999, 2003; 
Ravallion, Galasso, Lazo and Philipp 2001; Ronconi, Sanguinetti and Fachelli 2004; Ronconi, Sanguinetti, 
Fachelli, Casazza and Franceschelli 2006; Gasparini, Haimovich and Oliveri 2006; Almeida and Galasso 
2007; Iturriza, Bedi and Sparrow 2008). For the political economy literature: The distribution of benefits is 
analyzed on various levels. On the individual level the administration of benefits is not only directly to the 
participants, but several intermediaries might be able to take a share of the benefit and exert political 
pressure on participants (Galasso and Ravallion 2003; 2004; Lodola 2003).  Piquetero organizations, which 
stage road blocks in order to receive workfare program benefits, also have the control of some share of the 
benefits (Ronconi and Franceschelli 2005). Provinces and municipalities close to certain political parties 
might also be able to influence the distribution of the workfare benefit (Lodola 2003; Giovagnoli 2005; 
Weitz-Shapiro 2006). 
 
  7market in relation to workfare program participants. 
Several findings on labor market informality and its relationship with workfare programs 
are raised in the previous literature relating to workfare programs in Argentina. 
In an analysis of Plan Jefes and its impact, using the national household survey for 2001 
and 2002 for probit estimations, Paz and Zadicoff (2003) claim that informal workers 
have more chances to become participants in Plan Jefes than the unemployed and thereby 
informality is fostered. Relating to this point Galasso and Ravallion (2003, 2004) also 
argue that previous unemployment status of workfare participants is hard to verify with a 
high degree of informality in the economy present. Using data for 2001 and 2002 they 
estimated the workfare program impact with a counterfactual comparison group based on 
a matched of Plan Jefes applicants, who did not receive the program yet. Despite some 
problems of eligibility and coverage of the workfare program they conclude from their 
difference-in-difference estimations that the program helped to reduce unemployment 
and alleviate poverty. 
Another major workfare program evaluation by Ronconi et al. (2004, 2006) employs 
household survey for the period 2000 to 2002 to evaluate the impact of not only Plan 
Jefes but also other workfare programs on poverty and employment. They work with a 
propensity score matching estimator, without the particular focus on informality. Their 
results are in line with Galasso and Ravallion (2003, 2004) in terms of findings with 
respect to the program impact and targeting nature of the program. In addition to that they 
find that the workfare programs operated more as unemployment insurance for 
beneficiaries and not as a training program as participants who were offered a job in the 
labor market exited the program. 
Investigating informality and workfare program exits Gasparini, Haimovich and Oliveri 
(2006) employ a matching difference-in-difference estimator for their analysis of the 
period 2003 to 2005. They find that the design of the workfare program Plan Jefes 
increased the incentives for current participants to find a job in the informal sector and 
thereby resulted in an informality bias of the program. 
In this paper the focus differs from the existing literature with the emphasis on workfare 
program participants and a comparison to eligible labor force participants in informal 
waged work without benefits and self-employed in the low-income sector at a time before 
  8program universality. Contrary to Gasparini, Haimovich and Oliveri (2006) I do not look 
at the program exits, but at comparability between participants and low-income informal 
sector work in a situation of limited program access. The informal labor market and 
program participation were not incorporated in these studies as potential substitutes. 
The importance of the informal sector for unemployed workers as an alternative to the 
workfare program as a source of income is important. This seems in particular relevant 
given the limited coverage of the Argentine unemployment insurance system (Vodopivec 
2004; Gill, Montenegro and Doemeland 2002). In the absence of the availability of a 
workfare program the unemployed, the informals and inactive would have to refer to 
work in the labor market. In the light of the economic crisis in 2001/02 informal sector 
jobs were found to be one of the main coping strategies (Fiszbein, Giovagnoli and Aduriz 
2002). The poor, which do not have access to savings, other resources or social capital, 
would have to resort to the informal sector for survival if a workfare program was not 
available to them. 
Contrary to the previous literature on informality and workfare programs in Argentina, 
this paper focuses on the period, October 2001, at the brink of the economic crisis and 
before the implementation of the near universal Plan Jefes program. An explicit empirical 
test of the comparability of workfare participants and informal workers and the self-
employed with low-income is proposed in this paper. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Empirical Strategy 
To test the role of being employed in the informal sector as an alternative to workfare 
participation, this paper estimates with nearest neighbor propensity score matching 
whether informal workers and self-employed and workfare participation exhibit similar 
observable characteristics or not. In recent empirical literature on development several 
papers have employed this technique to compare informal and formal workers’ wage 
gaps (Pratap and Quintin 2006; Badaoui, Strobl and Walsh 2008). Also a related paper on 
workfare program, which analyses the exits of the workfare program, uses matching 
techniques (Gasparini, Haimovich and Oliveri 2006). 
Here, the focus is different: the comparison of current informal workers and self-
  9employed with low income to current workfare participants.
12
This paper employs propensity score matching for these two groups.
13 The workfare 
participants constitute the treatment group T while the informal sector workers and self-
employed with low income the control group C. As we are not able to observe the 
treatment group in its counterfactual state of non-treatment and the control group in its 
counterfactual state of treatment, the econometric method of matching on observables 
provides a way to construct an observationally equivalent group of informal sector 
participants to the treatment group of workfare participants. 
To implement matching and estimate the impact of treatment, propensity score matching 
requires two crucial underlying assumptions: the Conditional Independence Assumption 
(CIA from now onwards) and the Common Support Assumption.  
The CIA states that all the relevant differences between two individuals in the treated and 
in the control group are captured in their observable characteristics X and those affect 
participation in the treatment and outcomes. Treatment status is conditional on those 
observable characteristics: 
()X D Y Y C T | , ⊥                                                                                                                  (1) 
This underlying assumption is crucial and cannot be tested as such. A potential source of 
bias, which Bundell and Dias (2000) point out, is the selection on unobservables, which I 
do not account for here.
14
The common support condition (equation 2) assumes that participants can be matched to 
the non-participants with the same characteristics. The support of the distribution is the 
set of values with positive density.  
 
() 1 | 1 0 < = < X D prob  for all  X                                                                                       (2) 
 
                                                 
12 In a developed country context, but relevant to this paper, caseworkers and the unemployed are compared 
for similar characteristics through matching methods (Behncke, Froelich and Lechner 2009).  
13  For an overview on propensity score matching see Caliendo and Kopenig (2008).  
14 To overcome this matching is often combined with a difference-in-difference estimator (Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd 1997; Heckman, Lalonde and Smith 1999). Due to the nature of the program, which 
was expanded substantially in the period following my analysis, this will not be possible to implement it 
here.  
  10It follows from the common support that it is possible to estimate the average treatment 
of the treated from the average outcome from the non-treated, which is used as the 
counterfactual in this case, given their similar observable characteristics.  
Both assumptions so far have highlighted the importance of the characteristics X. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) propose the use of the propensity score instead of 
the characteristics X themselves (equation 3). They define the propensity score as the 
conditional probability of assignment to a particular treatment given a vector of observed 
characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin1983, p.1; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984, p.1). 
 
( X D prob X P | 1 ) ( = = )                                                                                                     (3) 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) show that the CIA assumption still holds when using 
the propensity score of the observed characteristics instead of the covariates X 
themselves: 
 
() ) ( | , X P D Y Y C T ⊥                                                                                                             (4) 
 
Propensity score matching requires a specific range of the propensity score for the 
treatment and the comparison group to be defined. For this reason, several matching 
methods, for instance one-to-one, nearest neighbor, kernel, are most commonly used.  
As Bundell and Costa Dias (2000) suggested, the nearest neighbor matching estimator 
can be written as follows:  
()
T T t
c t MM N
Y Y
1 ˆ ∑ − =
ε
θ                                                                                                         (5) 
where observation c is the nearest neighbor of the comparison group C in terms of the 
propensity score to observation t in treatment group T. N represents the number of 
nearest neighbor specified. This estimator is applied here to test the hypothesis that 
informal wage workers and self-employed with low-income are potential workfare 
program entrants and are observationally similar. To find supporting evidence, being able 
to match the treatment and control group, for this hypothesis would imply that the main 
limitation to access the workfare program is the limited availability and not their 
  11eligibility and characteristics. If it is possible to match these two groups, one can estimate 
impact of the treatment, workfare program participation, the average treatment on the 
treated effect (ATT).  
Matching accounts for the selection on observables such as individual, household or 
region characteristics which might influence program participation. It also controls for 
observable heterogeneous returns. Matching estimators would only compare people who 
would be comparable due to the common support assumption when matching on the 
propensity score. For this reason it is possible to determine whether the impact results are 
reliable or not (Sianesi 2004) 
The disadvantage would be that a great sample size is necessary to operationalize 
matching and that the selection on the observables is highly dependent on the quality of 
X used in the matching procedure. The matching quality can best tested through a 
balancing of variables test, usually a t-test on the equality of the means in the treated and 
non-treated groups before and after the matching (Sianesi 2004).  
For the matching to be successful it is necessary that there is enough common support 
between the two samples. Hence, the densities of the propensity scores for treatment and 
control group overlap. Smith (2000) emphasizes this so-called “support” problem. It can 
happen that the participants sample and the non-participants sample will not have any 
observations for certain values of P(X). This would imply that the two samples differ.  
For a successful estimation of the treatment one would need an analogue for each of the 
participants in the non-participant sample. To impose the common support one would 
drop the treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or 
less than the minimum propensity score of the controls. 
In addition to that if treatment impact differs across the treated, the restriction to the 
common support might change the parameters estimated and it would be impossible to 
identify the average treatment on the treated effect (Smith 2003).  
To check for heterogeneous effects of the workfare program it is possible to divide the 
sample into subsamples and to check whether results are robust or differ. This was 
implemented in this paper with different comparison groups, in order to see whether the 
informal workers and self-employed can form a valid comparison group as opposed to 
other comparison groups.  
  12As highlighted before the challenge is the appropriate selection of X variables in the 
estimation of the propensity score is important for the identification. For this reason the 
estimations will include variables that are thought to be related to the eligibility criteria 
and that determine participation in the program.   
3.2 Data  
Like previous studies on the Argentine labor market (Gasparini 2002; Pratap and Quintin 
2006), this paper works with the national household survey, the Encuesta Permanente de 
Hogares (EPH). The EPH was collected twice a year, in May and October, until May 
2003, by the Argentine national statistical office (INDEC). This rotating panel survey 
covered the major urban areas and thereby about 70 per cent of the Argentine population. 
Two questionnaires, an individual and household questionnaire, were administered to 
cover income, benefits receipts, demographic, dwelling, occupation, education and labor 
market characteristics. 
This paper works with the October wave of the 2001 EPH survey, at the outset of the 
economic crisis and pre-Plan Jefes survey, for the nearest neighbor propensity score 
matching for comparison (informal sector workers with low wages/income) and treatment 
group (workfare participants). Construction of the variables for the estimation of the 
propensity score, the probability of program participation, are derived from the eligibility 
criteria and knowledge of the workfare programs in Argentina, which were outlined in 
the previous section. 
The availability of questions in the EPH survey limits the different individual, household 
and regional characteristics to be included in the estimation. Also in the October 2001 
wave of the EPH survey the question whether the individual participates in a workfare 
program was asked, which was used to construct the treatment group in the estimations. 
One limitation and caveat here in this analysis is the fact that the question relating to 
workfare programs does not ask which specific program the individual participates and 
works in. 
As there are several national and regional workfare programs ongoing at the time of the 
household survey, a concern might be the possibility of the respondents participating in 
different programs. This could potentially introduce some measurement error into the 
treatment group measure due to potentially slightly different eligibility criteria. However, 
  13as the main eligibility criteria across different workfare programs were the same as 
highlighted beforehand and at the time of October 2001 Plan Trabajar III was the largest 
national workfare program, this problem does not seem to be large. 
Hence, the question in the household survey whether the individuals works as part of a 
workfare program or not determines the classification of the treatment group. To test the 
validity of the informal workers in paid employment and the self-employed as possible 
comparable group to the treatment group, different comparison groups were constructed 
from the information in the household survey. In the next section these results are 
explained in detail. 
 
4. Results 
In the following section the three different comparison groups are described and 
thereafter the results for the propensity score matching for the comparison groups are 
discussed, with particular focus on the variables included in the propensity score, the 
details of the matching process in terms of common support and matching quality and 
also the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT).  
4.1 Potential Comparison Groups 
Viewing the unemployed, the self-employed and informal waged workers in terms of 
their access to social protection is crucial in this analysis.
15 As the social protection status 
is highly dependent on the labor market status at the time and on the labor market history 
of the individual, it is possible to look at the unemployed, the self-employed and informal 
waged workers as a group with limited or no access to social protection, but potentially 
eligible for social assistance programs, such as workfare programs (Bertranou and Bonari 
2005). For Argentina Bertranou and Bonari (2005) classify three groups in the labor force 
for their social protection analysis when looking at unemployment insurance and 
workfare programs: 
Formal workers with permanent status form one of the groups, unemployed and 
informal/self-employed workers with low-income is another group and the third group is 
an intermediate group which alternates between self-employed, employee and 
                                                 
15 The sample sizes of the adult population, the unemployed, self-employed, informal workers and workfare 
participants are provided in the annex.  
  14unemployed status. 
To create a comparison group for the workfare participants, this categorization, the 
eligibility criteria and details of the workfare program, as mentioned previously, were 
taken into account. 
The following three comparison groups (1,2,3) were compiled: 
•  Group 1 includes the eligible labor force, the unemployed, informal and self-
employed without unemployment benefit and not in formal work. This provides a 
very general category and the broadest comparison group from the three groupings 
for the workfare participants. 
•  Group 2 is constructed more restrictive than Group 1. Here, the eligibility criteria 
from the workfare program and the element of self-targeting were taken into account. 
The benefit of the program is below the minimum wage (Jalan and Ravallion 2003). 
Only individuals with income at or below the level of the minimum wage of ARG$ 
200 peso were taken into account for this group. 
•  Group 3 restricts this even further as only informal workers and the self-employed, 
following partly the classification of Bertranou and Bonari (2005) for Argentina, are 
considered. In this case, the informal workers and the self-employed with low income 
(below or at the minimum wage), that are eligible for the workfare program, form the 
comparison group 
In Table 2 the summary statistics for the three different comparison groups is presented.
16 
As for the comparison group the most restrictive, Group 3, was chosen while the other 
comparison groups, group 1 and 2, were used in the robustness checks of the results. 
Employing Group 3 as comparison group to the workfare participants allows to test the 
initial hypothesis proposed in this paper.     
4.2 Comparison group: Informal waged workers and the self-employed with below 
or at minimum wage earnings 
To compare workfare participants and the constructed comparison group of low-income 
informal workers and self-employed eligible for workfare program, we employ single 
nearest neighbor propensity score matching for these two groups. 
                                                 
16Summary statistics for the workfare participants, informal workers, self-employed, the unemployed and 
the adult population are in the annex. 
  15The probit model to estimate their probability of participation (the propensity score) 
includes different individual, household and regional characteristics (Table 3).  
The  dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual participates in the 
workfare program 1 or not 0. The other characteristics included are selected closely 
related to the eligibility criteria and the description of the program, which included 
certain characteristics (see section 2). Age, gender, head of household and marital status 
are included as individual level characteristics and its potential to determine individual 
participation. In particular, age restrictions to participation and also restrictions to being 
the household head are relevant as they are relevant and eligibility criteria to participate 
in the program. The education level is included as different levels of completed or not 
completed education might play a role in the likelihood to participate in the program.
17 
The household characteristics (number of members and children, living arrangements) 
are included as important determinants of participation. Having children in the household 
was one of the eligibility criteria at least initially invoked in Plan Trabajar.
18 
Infrastructure problems, non-access to services and other relevant characteristics of 
shantytowns in Argentina, most commonly known as ‘villa miseria’, are included. Any 
problems with access to water, sewerage, electricity, a sanitary bathroom and unstable 
building material of the house were seen as indicator for living in a shantytown. Given 
that the Plan Trabajar’s design aimed at individuals self-selecting into the program, 
which were centered around public works projects relating to the development of local 
infrastructure, residence in the poor urban areas and provinces are relevant variables to 
determine program participation (Jalan and Ravallion 1999, 2003). For this reason also 
regions were included in the estimation, with the area of Greater Buenos Aires being the 
base.
19 Many of these variables were also included in the earlier literature on program 
impact evaluation in Argentina (Jalan and Ravallion 1999, 2003; Galasso and Ravallion 
                                                 
17 Savanti and Patrinos (2005) document the rising returns to schooling in Argentina over the period 1992-
2002. In particular, they find evidence of increases in the earnings premium to complete secondary and 
complete/incomplete tertiary education. 
 
18 As pointed out in section 2 eligibility criteria were amended for Plan Trabajar at several occasions and 
here the most relevant potential criteria are included.  
 
19 Pampeana, Cuyo, Patagonia, Northeast (NEA in tables) and Northwest (NOA in tables) are the other 
regions.  
  162003, 2004; Ronconi et al. 2004, 2006; Gasparini, Haimovich and Olivieri 2006). In 
Table 3 I include these variables in a probit regression. Age, gender, number of primary 
household members, location in terms of province and shantytowns were found to be 
significant determinants of program participation. Education levels, marital status and 
number of children and living arrangements were not significant in this model. The 
treatment and control group can be matched on some of the observables while others 
were not significant predictors of the probability of workfare participation. The 
propensity score derived from the entire vector of covariates was estimated and obtained 
for both control and treatment group. Figure 2 plots the densities of the propensity scores 
for both and one still finds an overlapping large common support. The results of the 
matching show that most observations of the treatment group are on the common support 
and only very few treatment observations are dropped (Table 4). Based on the matched 
sample of controls and treatment, the program impact on individual income for the 
treated (ATT) can be estimated (Table 5). The individual income variable is monthly 
individual income, from labor and non-labor sources. The income difference between the 
treated and the untreated was significant and positive. Participation in a workfare 
program had an individual income impact of an additional 20 Argentine Peso per month 
for the average ‘treated’ person if one compares the low income group of workfare 
participants and informal and self-employed earning a low income. This is only about 10 
percent of the minimum wage at the time. The estimate of the program impact, the ATT, 
is only as good as the matching quality. A test of the balance of the covariates was 
performed. This t-test compares the equality of the means in the treated and non-treated 
groups before and after the matching (Table 6). It is possible to see that the unmatched 
means exhibit a significant difference in the means while the matched treatment and 
control group do not have a significant difference in the means for most covariates.
20 
Overall, these results suggest several important insights: First, it is possible to match a 
treatment group of workfare participants and informal sector participants as control with 
nearest neighbor propensity score matching and a program impact is estimated. Second, 
not all observable characteristics are predicators of program participation, when using 
                                                 
20 Also it is found that the bias in the sample was reduced substantially. Results for the absolute bias before 
and after the matching can be found in the annex.  
  17these treatment and control groups. From these results it is possible to conclude that 
observable characteristics are still significantly different for the entire two groups and 
only a subset of workfare participants and informal sector participants exhibit similar 
characteristics. Hence, only a subset of individuals from the low-earning informal 
segment of the labor market is comparable to the workfare participants and sees this as a 
substitutable alternative.  
4.3 Other comparison groups
21
The less restrictive comparison groups, Group 1 and Group 2, are also estimated in the 
propensity score matching procedures. It is found that the significance of the variables 
included in the probit model, which estimates the propensity of participation in the 
program, differs slightly compared to Group 3. More variables such as education 
variables, more regions and number of children in the household are significant 
predictors of participation in the workfare program than in the Group 3 case.  
Also the ATT, when using these groups as comparison, is significant and larger than 
when the estimation is performed with Group 3 as comparison group.  
This again can be taken as an indication that workfare participants are not only sourced 
from the informal sector, and if from this sector only from a subset. Participants are 
comparable to the broader eligible labor force and the ones with low-income as well and 
have a considerable amount of observable characteristics in common with these groups. 
   
5. Conclusion 
Previous work on program evaluation provided some evidence on targeting leakages to 
informal workers and the inactive population (Ravallion and Galasso 2003) while this 
paper highlighted the need to analyze pre-program expansion the potential participants 
from the informal and self-employed sectors for which inactivity or unemployment for 
lack of unemployment insurance is not a feasible option for survival. 
This paper tested whether a group of informal low-waged workers and the self-employed 
with low-income and a group of workfare program participants exhibit common 
observable characteristics and so are comparable. The unemployment insurance and 
                                                 
21 Results for Comparison Group 1 and 2 are in the annex. The focus of this paper is on the Group 3 as the 
control/comparison group.  
  18workfare program access for the time period under consideration is limited, prior a large-
scale implementation of a workfare program, and the economic situation worsens from a 
recession into a crisis. The finding of comparability, with a simple test with single 
nearest-neighbor propensity score matching with replacement, implied a substitution 
effect for a sub-group of the informal workers: Instead of earning a low-income a 
subgroup of informal waged workers and the self-employed could be potential entrants to 
an expanded workfare program, while currently working in the low-income informal and 
self-employed labor market to earn a living, in the absence of access to social protection. 
The construction of the comparison group was restricted to the non-participant population 
and its subgroup of informal employees and the self-employed, with wages and incomes 
less or equal to the workfare benefit. One concern here could be that this is already a 
selection on observable characteristics. However, this just restricts the non-participant 
population to a population that fulfils the general eligibility criteria of not earning a 
certain amount of income before the program (in this case at or below the minimum 
wage) and does not have access to the program. This criticism would also apply to other 
studies on program evaluation as well, which restrict comparison groups from the general 
survey population in some form, for instance to labor force participants, before the 
analysis (Galasso and Ravallion 2003; Ronconi, Sanguinetti and Fachelli 2004). 
Here, the comparison and the treatment group exhibited a large common support and then 
matching along the observable characteristics, which determined participation and 
fulfilled the eligibility criteria, was possible. This supports the hypothesis that in terms of 
observables the informal waged and the self-employed with low-income who are eligible 
in terms of the general eligibility criteria under Plan Trabajar and other workfare 
programs but do not have access, are similar to the program participants and can be 
analyzed in workfare program evaluation as control group in general. However, as the 
observable characteristics between the comparison, the informal sector, and the treatment 
group, the workfare beneficiaries, turned to out to be significantly different from each 
other for many of the observables, in fact they did not predict the probability of workfare 
participation, we cannot conclude that for the entire group of informal workers workfare 
and informal jobs are substitutes. It is the sub-group of the informal sector which can be 
matched to the workfare participants and see informal work and program participation as 
  19substitutable alternatives.  
For this present case after making the individuals from the treated and control 
comparable through matching, the program impact with this control group sample is 
calculated and we also found that that the ATT of the program was only 20 ARG Peso 
per month. 
In the social protection literature on Argentina, informal workers and the self-employed 
with low-income are a separate category of analysis when looking at protection against 
unemployment (Bertranou and Bonari 2005). The informal and formal distinction in 
terms of social security contribution is incorporated in my analysis but in addition to this 
informality in terms of coverage of unemployment insurance and workfare program 
coverage is considered. This links to the argument proposed by Levy (2008) who argues 
that social assistance, such as cash transfer programs, represent a subsidy to the informal 
workers while social protection, in terms of social security, is a tax to formal workers. He 
argues that these programs create incentives to stay informal instead of changing to 
formality.  
For the incentives and design of workfare programs the results of this paper are relevant 
in the presence of low coverage of unemployment insurance and workfare program 
expansion during economic crisis. Given that some informal sector workers have similar 
observable characteristics to workfare participants, the low-income informal waged and 
the self-employed, without unemployment benefits and workfare plan access, work in 
order to make ends meet, as suggested by Joan Robinson's idea quoted at the beginning 
of this paper. Although eligible and having similar observable characteristics, access to 
the workfare program remains restricted to a few, often linked to political influence and 
clientelism (Jalan and Ravallion 1999, 2003; Narayan and Petesch 2002). For instance, in 
the Argentine case study of the `Voices of the Poor' project, an interviewed day care 
director voices this: 
 
"We have practically no access to Plan Trabajar; it is politically organized around 
fifteen neighborhoods. We managed to work for six months, but after that they pulled the 
plug." Narayan and Petesch 2002, pp.354 
 
  20This quote also highlights the political dimension and the geographical location of 
program participation, which is also reflected in the highly significant estimates of 
relevant geographical characteristics such as infrastructure and location in my results. 
This paper looked at the before universal workfare programs at a time when the economic 
crisis in 2001 was ongoing and high unemployment was present in the labor market. The 
expansion of the workfare programs was decided after a period of political unrest, for 
instance road blocks, protests and the subsequent overturning of the government, which 
highlighted the difficult economic situation of many and the government’s need to 
intervene in order to stabilize the country’s situation.  
The results of this paper give us further insights into the working of the labor market 
during this period: The labor market segments (the informal waged and self-employed 
with low income) could be possible future workfare entrants in the case of the expansion 
of workfare programs to the near universal program Plan Jefes. A substitution of low-
paid informal and self-employed work for program participation, if access is granted, can 
be expected, at least for some, and should be considered in the design of a social 
protection program. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) also argue that the composition of 
program participants changes as the program expands or phases out, which may be 
important to consider in the design of a social assistance program that responds to an 
economic crisis. Overall, the informal sector, even at the lower end of income, seems to 
be not one group, some similar to current workfare participants and others not.
22 As for 
the debate in the literature on the composition of the informal sector and whether 
informal labor markets are segmented or integrated, these results even support further 
subdivisions or tiers in the informal sector and the sector’s heterogeneity.  
                                                 
22 For a summary on the debate of segmentation and integration see World Bank (2007). The traditional 
view of the Harris-Todaro model suggests segmentation of the formal and informal labor market (Harris 
and Todaro 1970). In this view the informal sector participants are involuntary in the informal sector.  
Contrary to this, Maloney (2004) supports the view of voluntary microentrepreneurs in the informal sector. 
Fields (1990) proposes an informal sector which is two-tiered, the lower tier being involuntary in the sector 
while the upper-tier being voluntary.  
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Table 1: Unemployment Insurance Coverage, 2001 and 2002 
percent no. percent no.
Unemployed without benefit 97.08 5,421 97.23 4,778
Unemployed with benefit 2.92 97 2.77 108
Sample Size 5,518 4,886
Note: Without receiving income from unemployment insurance. 
Source: own calculations based on the October waves of the EPH, INDEC. 
2002
Unemployment Insurance and the Unemployed
2001
 
Table 2: Comparison Groups – Different measures 
mean stdv. mean stdv. mean stdv.
Individual characteristics
Age 38.17 14.20 35.79 14.70 37.47 15.28
Male 0.59 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.50
Head of Household 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.36 0.48
Spouse 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.26 0.44
Married 0.56 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.50
Single 0.34 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.36 0.48
incomplete primary education 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.36
complete primary education 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.36 0.48
incomplete secondary education 0.21 0.41 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
complete secondary education 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.12 0.33
incomplete tertiary education 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.29
complete tertiary education 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
Household characteristics
No. of primary hhs.members 4.41 2.27 4.69 2.41 4.79 2.53
Hhs. with secondary members 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
No. of Children in hhs. 1.22 1.55 1.33 1.68 1.49 1.80
House ownership 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.70 0.46
Living arrangement - unstable 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.21
House materials - unstable 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
Water 0.98 0.12 0.98 0.14 0.98 0.16
Bathroom - sanitary 0.84 0.37 0.78 0.42 0.73 0.44
Sewerage 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.49
Electricity 1.00 0.07 0.99 0.09 0.99 0.10
Region
GBA 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.50
Pampeana 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39
Cuyo 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26
NOA 0.09 0.28 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33
Patagonia 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
NEA 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25
Sample Size
Population
Note: Without workfare participants. Above 16 years.  
1/ Group 1: Labour force:
Unemployed (no benefit income) and not formal work (informal and self-employed)
2/ Group 2: Labour force: 
Unemployed (no benefit income) and not formal work (informal and self-employed).
Below or at minimum wage ARG $200. Coherent responses for income only. 
3/ Group 3: Informal workers and self-employed. 
Below or at minimum wage ARG $200. Coherent responses for income only. 












  28Table 3: Estimation of the propensity score (Group 3) 
Probit Probit, 150 replics Marginal effects
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001***
[3.46] [3.64] [3.46]
Male -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.029***
[3.87] [3.60] [3.87]
Head of Household 0.073 0.073 0.009
[0.97] [0.97] [0.97]
Married 0.086 0.086 0.01
[1.42] [1.46] [1.42]
incomplete secondary education -0.064 -0.064 -0.007
[0.88] [0.94] [0.88]
complete secondary education -0.054 -0.054 -0.006
[0.59] [0.60] [0.59]
incomplete tertiary education -0.101 -0.101 -0.011
[0.86] [0.91] [0.86]
complete tertiary education -0.239 -0.239 -0.024
[1.28] [1.23] [1.28]
No.of primary household members 0.025* 0.025* 0.003*
[1.87] [1.84] [1.87]
No. of children in hhs.  0.031 0.031* 0.004
[1.63] [1.79] [1.63]
living arrangement - unstable 0.144 0.144 0.019
[1.25] [1.50] [1.25]
infrastructure problems/villa miseria 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.027***
[3.59] [3.62] [3.59]
Pampeana 0.198** 0.198** 0.026**
[2.13] [2.21] [2.13]
Cuyo -0.124 -0.124 -0.014
[1.02] [1.03] [1.02]
NOA 0.024 0.024 0.003
[0.25] [0.24] [0.25]
Patagonia 0.669*** 0.669*** 0.122***
[5.79] [5.72] [5.79]




Observations 4961 4961 4961
pseudo R-squared 0.056 0.056 0.056
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 







  29Table 4: Matching on and off common support (Group 3) 
From Matching:
From Matching:
treatment assignment off support on support Total
untreated 0 4,611 4,611
treated 5 345 350
Total 5 4,956 4,961
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 




Table 5: Program impact (Group 3) 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
income ATT 139.64 119.55 20.08*** 6.56 3.06
6.93 2.90
Note: In bold standard error and t-statistics are based on 150 bootstraps. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on bootstrapped s.e..
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. 
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  31Annex: Descriptive Statistics, Additional Figures and Tables 
Figures 
















0 .05 .1 .15 .2 .25
propensity score
comparison group treatment group
Test for Common Support
 
Source: own calculations based on the EPH, INDEC.  
 
Figure 5.A.2: Common Support of Treatment and Control Group - Group 2 (Labor force 
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Test for Common Support
 
Source: own calculations based on the EPH, INDEC.  
  32Tables: Descriptive Statistics 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  33Table A.2: Summary Statistics - Group 1 (Labor force participants) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 20296 37.20526 13.75308 13 98
Male 20302 0.596838 0.490545 0 1
Head of Household 20302 0.461186 0.498504 0 1
Married 20300 0.563202 0.496002 0 1
incomplete secondary education 20290 0.225579 0.417973 0 1
complete secondary education 20290 0.180877 0.384926 0 1
incomplete tertiary education 20290 0.104682 0.306151 0 1
complete tertiary education 20290 0.084081 0.277516 0 1
No.of primary household members 20008 4.602109 2.422007 1 22
No.of children in hhs. 20302 1.325387 1.612969 0 11
living arrangements - unstable 20298 0.036752 0.188158 0 1
infrastructure problems/villa miseria 20302 0.436558 0.495971 0 1
Pampeana 20302 0.312482 0.463516 0 1
Cuyo 20302 0.105507 0.307213 0 1
NOA 20302 0.212688 0.409219 0 1
Patagonia 20302 0.092553 0.289811 0 1
NEA 20302 0.116688 0.321056 0 1
Base: GBA, Single, Primary education. 
Note: infrastructure problems/villa miseria dummy indicates whether household has access to sewerage, 
electricity, a sanitary bathroom, water and stable built housing or not. 




Table A.3: Summary Statistics - Group 2 (Labor force participants with below or at 
minimum wage earnings) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 10068 34.79996 13.91601 17 98
Male 10070 0.519861 0.49963 0 1
Head of Household 10070 0.350646 0.477196 0 1
Married 10068 0.477553 0.499521 0 1
incomplete secondary education 10069 0.24054 0.427433 0 1
complete secondary education 10069 0.164565 0.370806 0 1
incomplete tertiary education 10069 0.104082 0.305382 0 1
complete tertiary education 10069 0.042507 0.201752 0 1
No.of primary household members 9934 4.927924 2.602038 1 22
No.of children in hhs. 10070 1.441708 1.730223 0 11
living arrangements - unstable 10067 0.044204 0.205558 0 1
infrastructure problems/villa miseria 10070 0.504171 0.500007 0 1
Pampeana 10070 0.293645 0.455454 0 1
Cuyo 10070 0.105065 0.306652 0 1
NOA 10070 0.238828 0.426389 0 1
Patagonia 10070 0.076266 0.265437 0 1
NEA 10070 0.126912 0.332891 0 1
Base: GBA, Single, Primary education. 
Note: infrastructure problems/villa miseria dummy indicates whether household has access to sewerage, 
electricity, a sanitary bathroom, water and stable built housing or not. 




  34Table A.4: Summary Statistics - Group 3 (Informal workers and self-employed with 
below or at minimum wage earnings) 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 5066 36.17548 14.36488 17 98
Male 5067 0.452141 0.497753 0 1
Head of Household 5067 0.357608 0.479343 0 1
Married 5065 0.513722 0.499861 0 1
incomplete secondary education 5066 0.231938 0.422112 0 1
complete secondary education 5066 0.129688 0.335993 0 1
incomplete tertiary education 5066 0.087446 0.282515 0 1
complete tertiary education 5066 0.033952 0.181123 0 1
No.of primary household members 4965 5.018933 2.701293 1 22
No.of children in hhs. 5067 1.580028 1.82583 0 11
living arrangements - unstable 5065 0.051925 0.221898 0 1
infrastructure problems/villa miseria 5067 0.533057 0.498955 0 1
Pampeana 5067 0.250641 0.433425 0 1
Cuyo 5067 0.1194 0.324291 0 1
NOA 5067 0.26564 0.441717 0 1
Patagonia 5067 0.068877 0.25327 0 1
NEA 5067 0.154529 0.361491 0 1
Base: GBA, Single, Primary education. 
Note: infrastructure problems/villa miseria dummy indicates whether household has access to sewerage, 
electricity, a sanitary bathroom, water and stable built housing or not. 


















  35Tables: Further results for the comparison groups 
Table A.5: Estimation of the Propensity Score (Group 1) 
   
Probit Probit, 150 replics Marginal effects
Age -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.000***
[2.74] [3.01] [2.74]
Male -0.333*** -0.333*** -0.024***
[8.51] [8.11] [8.51]
Head of Household 0.025 0.025 0.002
[0.55] [0.55] [0.55]
Married 0.019 0.019 0.001
[0.49] [0.45] [0.49]
incomplete secondary education -0.051 -0.051 -0.003
[1.09] [1.23] [1.09]
complete secondary education -0.101* -0.101* -0.006*
[1.90] [1.82] [1.90]
incomplete tertiary education -0.035 -0.035 -0.002
[0.53] [0.55] [0.53]
complete tertiary education -0.093 -0.093 -0.006
[1.26] [1.33] [1.26]
No.of primary household members 0.021** 0.021** 0.001**
[2.30] [2.01] [2.30]
No. of children in hhs.  0.044*** 0.044*** 0.003***
[3.36] [3.12] [3.36]
living arrangement - unstable 0.001 0.001 0.000
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
infrastructure problems/villa miseria 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.009***
[3.61] [3.71] [3.61]
Pampeana 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.019***
[4.05] [3.77] [4.05]
Cuyo 0.274*** 0.274*** 0.022***
[3.48] [3.53] [3.48]
NOA 0.210*** 0.210*** 0.016***
[3.04] [2.99] [3.04]
Patagonia 0.762*** 0.762*** 0.090***
[10.48] [10.16] [10.48]




Observations 19987 19987 19987
pseudo R-squared 0.0546 0.0546 0.0546
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 











treatment assignment off support on support Total
untreated 0 19,282 19,282
treated 2 703 705
Total 2 19,985 19,987
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 




Table A.7: Program impact (Group 1) 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
income ATT 269.24 233.79 35.45* 18.66 1.90
23.36 1.52
Note: In bold standard error and t-statistics are based on 150 bootstraps. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on bootstrapped s.e..
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. 
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10% 1.820 2.614 Obs 17
25% 7.035 5.640 Sum of Wgt. 17
50% 9.977 Mean 14.276
Largest Std. Dev. 10.984
75% 20.560 23.339
90% 33.080 29.962 Variance 120.653
95% 35.475 33.080 Skewness 0.639




10% 0 0.338 Obs 17
25% 0.576 0.408 Sum of Wgt. 17
50% 1.734 Mean 2.701
Largest Std. Dev. 2.604
75% 4.311 5.994
90% 7.045 6.227 Variance 6.779
95% 7.070 7.045 Skewness 0.572
99% 7.070 7.070 Kurtosis 1.782
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 
After Matching
Before Matching















  39Table A.10: Estimation of the Propensity Score (Group 2) 
   
Probit Probit, 150 replics Marginal effects
Age -0.005** -0.005** -0.000**
[2.13] [2.11] [2.13]
Male -0.345*** -0.345*** -0.023***
[6.27] [6.21] [6.27]
Head of Household 0.039 0.039 0.003
[0.59] [0.58] [0.59]
Married 0.110** 0.110** 0.007**
[2.02] [2.34] [2.02]
incomplete secondary education -0.127** -0.127** -0.008**
[1.97] [2.09] [1.97]
complete secondary education -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.013***
[2.89] [2.84] [2.89]
incomplete tertiary education -0.208** -0.208* -0.012**
[2.03] [1.92] [2.03]
complete tertiary education -0.368** -0.368** -0.018**
[2.26] [2.04] [2.26]
No.of primary household members 0.018 0.018 0.001
[1.54] [1.55] [1.54]
No. of children in hhs.  0.047*** 0.047** 0.003***
[2.70] [2.53] [2.70]
living arrangement - unstable 0.170* 0.170 0.013*
[1.65] [1.57] [1.65]
infrastructure problems/villa miseria 0.204*** 0.204*** 0.013***
[3.71] [3.66] [3.71]
Pampeana 0.131 0.131* 0.009
[1.62] [1.70] [1.62]
Cuyo -0.018 -0.018 -0.001
[0.17] [0.16] [0.17]
NOA 0.125 0.125* 0.009
[1.49] [1.67] [1.49]
Patagonia 0.558*** 0.558*** 0.057***
[5.61] [6.17] [5.61]




Observations 9928 9928 9928
pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.058 0.058
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 












treatment assignment off support on support Total
untreated 0 9,578 9,578
treated 1 349 350
Total 1 9,927 9,928
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 




Table A.12: Program impact (Group 2) 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
income ATT 139.90 71.92 67.98*** 5.97 11.40
8.77 7.75
Note: In bold standard error and t-statistics are based on 150 bootstraps. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, based on bootstrapped s.e..
ATT: Average Treatment Effect on the Treated. 
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 




















  41Table A.13: Assessment of matching quality (Group 2) 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10% 1.076 2.032 Obs 17
25% 9.706 6.480 Sum of Wgt. 17
50% 13.386 Mean 15.909
Largest Std. Dev. 11.244
75% 25.933 26.372
90% 33.359 28.835 Variance 126.426
95% 38.608 33.359 Skewness 0.485




10% 0.826 1.344 Obs 17
25% 2.914 2.417 Sum of Wgt. 17
50% 5.044 Mean 4.916
Largest Std. Dev. 2.739
75% 6.558 8.265
90% 8.316 8.286 Variance 7.500
95% 9.074 8.316 Skewness -0.090
99% 9.074 9.074 Kurtosis 1.832
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 
After Matching
Before Matching





















10% 5.026 5.433 Obs 17
25% 8.590 7.078 Sum of Wgt. 17
50% 13.362 Mean 14.943
Largest Std. Dev. 9.227
75% 20.598 21.760
90% 30.637 23.000 Variance 85.142
95% 33.137 30.637 Skewness 0.394




10% 0.000 0.609 Obs 17
25% 1.778 1.236 Sum of Wgt. 17
50% 3.820 Mean 4.781
Largest Std. Dev. 4.754
75% 6.982 7.701
90% 10.253 8.862 Variance 22.601
95% 18.576 10.253 Skewness 1.482
99% 18.576 18.576 Kurtosis 5.102
Source: own estimations based on the October EPH, INDEC. 
After Matching
Before Matching
Summary of the distribution of the abs(bias)
 
  44